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This brings us to an important secondary point in this book. Grounded to the
extent that he is in tradition, Schuon is so wary of innovations that he has
heretofore been reluctant to grant Protestantism the status of a fully orthodox
yana, or vehicle. Here, in an important chapter that focuses on Lutheranism but
alludes to Calvin and Anglicanism in passing, he acknowledges that it is such.
His reasons are in keeping with the ones he uses in simultaneously validating
Christianity and Islam. Protestantism allows expression to spiritual propensities
that Christianity had insufficiently provided for, ones which (to pursue the matter
of ethnic types) the Germanic temperament probably houses disproportionately.
Centering in an extreme consciousness of human limitations, one so acute that
it totally despairs of man's power to meliorate them, Luther turned directly to
God. Faith in God's power to effect a change is the human access to that change,
so faith and faith alone-solo fide-is the key to the kingdom. The reformer in
Luther should not be downplayed, but his destiny was to "gestalt" the components
of a spiritual personality type that has its rights. In doing so, he accomplished
for Christendom what his counterpart, the saint Shinran, effected for Japanese
Buddhism.
Returning to the primary theme of the book, its comparison of Christianity
and Islam, there is not room to go into specifics, but I can add another word
about the general drift through calling attention to the book's subtitle. Ecumenism
is much in the air these days, but Schuon has been so critical of the venture that
it is initially surprising to find the word appearing in one of his own titles. The
explanation is to be found in the prefix "esoteric" which Schuon uses to distinguish
his version of the enterprize.
The mistake of ecumenism as it is typically practiced--exoteric ecumenism
in Schuon's vocabulary-is that it tinkers with disparate theologies to try to
make them compatible. This can only produce a theological mishmash that
smacks more of committee compromises than of divine disclosure. It blurs
identities, causing the life to go out of them.
Esoteric ecumenism leaves existing theologies untouched. Instead, it cultivates
a non-creedal stance that honors alternatives while tempering their exclusivism.
It is like adding a third dimension to spiritual space. No two-dimensional photograph [articulated theology] can do justice to a building's mass [the fullness of
the divine Reality]. Yet even while circumambulating the building we can see
that photographs faithfully represent it from their respective perspectives.

Religious Experience, by Wayne Proudfoot. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985. Pp. xix, 263. Cloth, n.p.
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Proudfoot'~

hook offers a sustained examination of modern attempts to ground
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"religious belief and practice" in an "autonomous moment of human experience."
The attempt begins with Schleiermacher, and is guided by three convictions. (1)
Religious experience is pre-conceptual; it is the source of religious beliefs and
concepts, not an artifact of them. (2) Religious consciousness is intentional. The
subject seems to experience the Holy, or his absolute dependence on the "whence
of all existence." (The experience's intentionality gives it its authority and makes
it plausible to think that religious belief and practice grow from it.) (3) Since
religion expresses an autonomous moment of human experience, one can't
appropriately evaluate it in non-religious terms. Reductive descriptions or explanations of religious experience distort it.
Proudfoot thinks that "the program that Schleiermacher inaugurated" is fatally
flawed. For one thing, the first two theses are inconsistent. Intentional experiences
incorporate beliefs and concepts. Thus, the feeling of absolute dependence incorporates the belief that one is dependent on the whence of all existence. Experiences
can't be both pre-conceptual and intentional.
Nor is religion autonomous. Religious experiences incorporate explanatory
hypotheses-viz., that they are produced by non-natural causes. Mystics, for
example, claim to perceive God. Since "A perceives B" entails "B causes A's
experience of B," they are implicitly asserting that their experiences have a
non-natural origin. Because these embedded explanatory hypotheses are defeasible, religious experience isn't immune to criticism.
Proudfoot believes that religious apologists like Schleiermacher and D. Z.
Phillips have failed to see this because they have confused descriptive and
explanatory reduction. The first is indeed inappropriate. Actions and intentional
experiences are partly constituted by the subject's concepts and beliefs and must
therefore be described in terms available to him. Nevertheless, the investigator
needn't accept the subject's explanations of his experience. A description of
Teresa's experience which fails to point out that it seemed to her that she saw
Christ abstracts from important features of her experience and thus misrepresents
it. Her explanation of her experience, however, may be mistaken. Nothing is,
in principle, inappropriate in attributing her experience to natural causes.
Most of this seems to me correct or at least plausible. Proudfoot's other theses
are more controversial. He believes that (1) the noetic quality of a religious
experience should be identified with the embedded causal judgment and its
affective resonance. This allegedly implies that (2) a religious experience has
no intrinsic authority. The incorporated causal judgment is merely one hypothesis
among others, and should be accepted only if it provides a better overall explanation of the experience than its naturalistic competitors. (3) While the embedded
hypotheses could be correct, they are in fact suspect. Religious experiences
appear to be "artifacts" of the subject's religious or cultural tradition and not
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products of non-natural causes. I find Proudfoot's defense of these contentions
inadequate.
What does he mean by a "noetic experience"? If I understand Proudfoot
correctly, the following appears to be a paradigm example. On the basis of my
own observations or the authority of others, I believe, or am disposed to believe,
that a certain sort of pain in one's tooth is caused by cavities. Believing this, or
being disposed to believe it, and having such a pain, I spontaneously form the
belief that my pain is caused by a cavity. While my pain isn't noetic, the
experience as a whole is because it incorporates a causal judgment.
As this example indicates, noetic experiences needn't be perception-like. There
are important differences between noetic experiences, however, and these
shouldn't be glossed over. Proudfoot fails to distinguish three sorts of cases. (1)
Some experiences aren't regarded by the subject as perceptions of their object
even though a causal attribution is more or less spontaneously made. An example
is being angered by another's actions. (2) In other cases, one may have a feelingful
conviction of another's presence without thinking that one perceives her. Suppose
that before somewhat apprehensively subjecting myself to an experiment in
sensory deprivation, my wife tells me she will be present. I am blindfolded, my
ears are stopped, and so on. I continue to be very nervous but am sustained by
my conviction that someone who loves me is with me. (3) Finally, there are
perception-like states such as seeing a tree or hallucinating a goblin. Each of
these experiences incorporates a causal judgment. I spontaneously attribute my
anger to another's behavior, my confidence to my wife's presence, and my visual
impressions to a tree or goblin. Nevertheless, these experiences are different
from one another. The first doesn't involve a feeling of presence, and only the
third is perception-like.
Why are these distinctions important? Most of us think that perception-like
states have more cognitive value. While perceptual experiences can be delusive,
they seem to put us in contact with reality in a way in which anger, joy, or
convictions of presence do not. Nor is it clear that the noetic quality of perceptionlike states can be equated with the incorporated causal judgment and its affective
resonance. The "sensations," "feelings," or "impressions" (Proudfoot's terms)
which are attributed to the causal activity of a tree or goblin (and which can be
roughly indicated by "being appeared to treely" or "being appeared to goblinly")
have a peculiar quality which Berkeley indicated by "outness." This quality
doesn't clearly depend on making the appropriate causal judgment. For example,
even if I know that I am hallucinating, it may still seem to me that a goblin is
seated on my desk. The noetic quality of the relevant "sensations" may be
connected with a disposition to make the appropriate causal judgment but it is
doubtful whether "outness" can be equated with this disposition. (In my example,
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my toothache was connected with a disposition to attribute it to a cavity. Nevertheless, my toothache didn't have "outness.") Nor does Proudfoot provide reasons
for thinking that the disposition is the cause of the feeling of "outness" rather
than the reverse.
The relevance of these observations is, of course, this. Some religious experiences are like anger or gratitude, some only involve a feelingful conviction of
presence, and still others are perception-like. Proudfoot doesn't distinguish
between them, and treats each as if it were simply a conjunction of sensations,
feelings, impressions, or physiological states (a feeling of sweetness, an increased
heartbeat, a mental image, and so on) and an interpretative hypothesis. This
analysis is probably adequate for some religious experiences but distorts others.
For example, it doesn't do justice to the mystic'S deliberate and systematic use
of perceptual metaphors, or explain why they frequently distinguish their perception-like states from lower degrees of prayer which are not perception-like but
do involve spontaneous causal attributions.
Proudfoot's analysis is closely connected with his denial that religious experiences possess intrinsic authority. He sometimes talks as if the incorporated causal
judgment's defeasibility is sufficient to show this. If this is his view, he is
mistaken. The fact that an experience's authority can be destroyed by showing
that the embedded causal claim is false doesn't imply that its authority derives
from the claim's truth. The experience's authority may spring from the "outness"
of the sensations or impressions which the embedded claim "interprets," or from
the fact that these claims are expressions of reliable belief producing mechanisms,
or both. Proudfoot seems to think that an experience's authority is simply a
function of the correctness of its embedded claim but this is like saying that the
authority of a person's assertion is just a matter of its truth. This is often false.
While an assertion's authority will be undermined if it turns out to be mistaken,
it may derive from the speaker's reliability, his expertise, and so on.
But Proudfoot's principal reason for denying that religious experiences have
intrinsic authority lies in his conception of their nature. If a noetic experience
is some sort of conjunction of sensations or feelings and an explanatory hypothesis, and if a noetic experience's authority is identical with the truth of its
embedded causal hypothesis, then it is difficult to see why this hypothesis should
have more weight than others which allegedly explain the same phenomenon.
A consequence of Proudfoot's analysis is that ordinary perceptual experiences
have no intrinsic authority. They too consist of conjunctions of sensations or
impressions and explanatory hypotheses. Their authority too depends upon these
hypotheses providing the best overall explanation of the occurrence of the relevant
impressions. Why, then, should one think that the credentials of (some) religious
experiences are more dubious than those of ordinary perceptual experiences?
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Although he never answers this question directly, Proudfoot clearly thinks
that the causal judgments which are incorporated in religious experiences (and
hence the experiences themselves) are cultural artifacts. It is fairly clear that he
also believes that these judgments are either false or inadequately supported. He
may, then, think that religious experiences differ from perceptual experiences
because (1) the latter aren't just cultural artifacts and because (2) the judgments
they incorporate are more firmly established. But (2) involves well-known circularity problems, and (1) is highly contentious.
Proudfoot appears to think that if we abstract the embedded causal hypothesis
from a religious experience we leave nothing but accelerated heartbeats, vague
states of arousal, feelings of sweetness, amorphous mental images, and so on.
The experience's distinctively religious character depends on its intentionality
and this is structured by concepts and beliefs which the subject brings to it.
These tum out to be peculiar to the particular tradition in which the subject
stands. Teresa's experiences are artifacts of her Christian beliefs, and the feeling
of absolute dependence is an artifact of a culture deeply affected by theistic
concepts. Common features only emerge at very general levels of description
which abstract from the contribution made by the subject's tradition and therefore
misrepresent the subject'S experience. All that religious experiences clearly have
in common is their attribution to non-natural causes. There is, then, no significant
common core; religious experiences are the products of culture.
These contentions aren't adequately supported. Religious experiences are conceptually structured, and most are structured by distinctively religious concepts
and beliefs. Teresa, for example, doesn't merely perceive a loving presence,
she perceives Christ. But the subjects of religious experience bring all their
conceptual equipment and beliefs to their experiences, and their non-religious
concepts and beliefs can also shape them. If Proudfoot is right, for example,
religious experiences are structured by the concept of causality. Causality, however, isn't a peculiarly religious notion. What needs to be shown is that the
intentional character of religious experience is entirely due to the religious concepts and beliefs which the subject brings to his experience-that the more or
less spontaneous ascription of certain states, "impressions," "feelings" or "sensations'" to non-natural causes wouldn't occur in the absence of a prior commitment to, or familiarity with, religious systems of interpretation. Proudfoot hasn't
shown this and, indeed, doesn't seriously consider the possibility that human
beings have a natural tendency to interpret certain states religiously.
Proudfoot's account places all the explanatory weight on the interpretive systems which the subject brings to his experience. But what, then, accounts for
the interpretive systems? After reading Proudfoot's book, I still find it more
illuminating to suppose that religion grows out of real or apparent divine disclo-
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sures than to suppose that these disclosures are produced by religion (its beliefs,
practices, institutions, and so on)-for the latter leaves religion inadequately
accounted for. None of the alternative explanations (priestcraft, wish fulfillment,
or their more sophisticated variants) seem to me as plausible as the hypothesis
that among religion's principal causes are core experiences (or the core of certain
experiences) which, while conceptually structured, aren't specifically Jewish or
Buddhist or "animist," etc. Nor do I think that the peculiarities of these experiences can be entirely reduced to their conceptual components or to the latter's
affective resonance. Proudfoot's picture is unconvincing. It is as if someone
were to claim that perceptual experiences should be largely attributed to preexisting systems of perceptual belief. Our perceptual beliefs and concepts do
affect our perceptual experiences, but most of us think the explanatory relation
primarily runs the other way.
I have been sharply critical of a number of Proudfoot's theses. Nevertheless,
I warmly recommend his book. Proudfoot's arguments are stimulating, clearly
developed and, I think, significant. He has many illuminating things to say about
a number of issues, and his analysis does fit many religious experiences. In spite
of my disagreements with the author, I believe that Proudfoot's book should be
read by anyone seriously interested in the issue of religious experience.

NOTES

I. I have in mind such things as empty consciousness, Jonathan Edwards' feelings of sweetness,
a sense of loving presence (as distinguished from an emotionally resonant conviction that someone
loving is present), the fusion of boundaries and sense of expansion experienced by nature mystics,
and so on. If I am right. these things have "outness." They are typically parts of religious experiences,
and are closely connected with their intentionality. It is doubtful whether they can be adequately
identified without using intentional concepts. They nevertheless seem distinct from the embedded
perceptual or causal judgments and their affective resonance. In these respects, the feelings or
impressions in question resemble (e.g.) color "sensations." Color sensations are typically (but not
always) parts of perceptual experiences. They are closely connected with the latter's intentionality.
(They have "outness and, in normal subjects, their occurrence triggers a disposition to make certain
kinds of perceptual judgments.) They too are difficult to identify without using expressions that
allude to the relevant causal or perceptual judgments (e.g., "They are the sort of impressions or
sensations one has when one looks at red objects").

